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SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY IN A POST-STONERIDGE 
WORLD: YES, A SUCCESSFUL SUIT AGAINST SECONDARY 
ACTORS IS STILL POSSIBLE 
Charles J. Wilkes∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The corporate scandals of the past decade have forced plaintiffs, 
courts, and scholars alike to grapple with the scope of secondary-
actor liability in securities fraud cases.
1
  When does liability under our 
nation’s securities laws extend to lawyers, accountants, and invest-
ment bankers who draft the documents, develop the procedures, and 
structure the transactions that facilitate acts of securities fraud by ma-
jor corporations?  Does liability extend to such actors at all?  In re-
sponse to lingering questions, the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted a writ of certiorari to hear Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (“Stoneridge”).
2
  Widely viewed as the 
most important securities case of recent memory, many hoped Stone-
ridge would resolve the uncertainty surrounding secondary-actor lia-
bility.
3
 
In Stoneridge, the Court found that a vendor who had enabled 
one of its customers to defraud its investors could not be held liable 
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America.  I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Kristin N. 
Johnson, for her invaluable guidance and suggestions.  My sincere gratitude also ex-
tends to my wonderful parents, Barry and Kim Wilkes, for their support during my 
law school career and to my friends, especially Chris Khatami, Brienne Henderson, 
and Dave Kurtz, for their friendship and selfless assistance during the past year. 
 1 For the purposes of this Comment, primary actors include the issuers of securi-
ties, and secondary actors generally include those who provide services to primary 
actors, such as lawyers, accountants, investment bankers and other vendors.  See Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994).  “The use of the term ‘secondary actor’ relates only to the party’s role in the 
transaction, not secondary or imputed liability.”  Rodney D. Chrisman, Stoneridge v. 
Scientific-Atlanta: Do Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Require a Misstatement or Omission?, 26 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 839, 896 (2008). 
 2 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 3 See Chrisman, supra note 1, at 839–40 (discussing the views of several commen-
tators after the Supreme Court granted certiorari). 
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Act”).
4
  The most important question raised by the case was whether a 
secondary actor must make a material, public misstatement to be 
found liable in a private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.
5
  More specifically, the Court focused on whether a material, public 
misstatement is a prerequisite to finding that an investor relied
6
 on a 
secondary actor’s deceptive acts in cases where the secondary actor 
does not owe a duty of disclosure to the investor.
7
  The Court posited 
that such a public misstatement is not required for a plaintiff to at-
tach liability but concluded that the defendants’ actions were still 
“too remote” from the investors’ losses for the plaintiffs to demon-
strate reliance.
8
  But it is unclear when the causal connection between 
an investor’s losses and a secondary actor’s deceptive acts would be 
sufficient to allow a court to impute reliance and attach liability to the 
secondary actor.
9
 
 
 4 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act) created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and authorized it to 
promulgate rules governing several issues related to securities transactions on sec-
ondary markets, including securities fraud, insider trading, shareholder voting via 
proxy solicitations, tender offers, and periodic disclosures by publicly held corpora-
tions.  BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
CORPORATIONS 404–05 (William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge 
eds., 7th ed. 2009).  Section 10(b), in particular, authorizes the SEC to promulgate 
rules prohibiting fraudulent activities with respect to the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.  15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); see discussion infra Part II.A. 
 5 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.  With respect to the sale or purchase of securi-
ties, Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act, broadly prohibits engaging in deceptive and manipulative activities, 
making untrue statements of material fact, and omitting material facts that would 
render statements made not misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see discussion 
infra Part II.A. 
 6 Reliance is a key requirement of securities-fraud actions under Rule 10b-5, 
providing the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s violation of the rule 
and a plaintiff’s losses.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).  Due to the 
reality that most securities transactions do not take place in face-to-face encounters, 
securities law dispenses with the requirement of positive poof of reliance on a defen-
dant’s deception.  Id. at 243–44.  The semi-strong form of the efficient-capital-
markets hypothesis posits that the market price of a security reflects all publicly avail-
able information.  RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (9th ed. 2008).  Therefore, because investors 
rely on the integrity of a security’s market price, reliance is presumed when miss-
tatements are made in an impersonal and well-developed marketplace.  Basic, 485 
U.S. at 247. 
 7 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 
(2008).  
 8 Id.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247, for a discussion about proving reliance in a well-
developed securities market where the fraud-on-the-market presumption is applica-
ble.  
 9 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 485, 490–92 (2008). 
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By not providing a clear framework for determining the exis-
tence of such a causal connection, Stoneridge has left an unsettled 
landscape for shareholders wishing to pursue actions against second-
ary actors.
10
  As one commentator noted, Justice Kennedy and the ma-
jority were more concerned with whether their ruling would expand 
the scope of liability under § 10(b) than about proposing a workable 
standard for the reliance requirement.
11
  Consequently, Stoneridge nei-
ther closed the door on liability for secondary actors nor established 
when a secondary actor can be found liable for committing deceptive 
acts within the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  This result, of 
course, is confusing and discouraging for injured shareholders who 
want to seek restitution against secondary actors for their losses.
12
 
To resolve the open questions that remain, this Comment pro-
poses a new standard pursuant to which a plaintiff is entitled to a pre-
sumption of reliance when a secondary actor undertakes intentional 
actions aimed at causing the issuance of a misleading statement.  Part 
II of this Comment discusses the evolution of the scope of liability 
under § 10(b) from the passing of the Exchange Act through the Su-
preme Court’s Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A.
13
 (“Central Bank”) decision in 1994.  Part III discusses the 
post-Central Bank circuit split over the scope of secondary-actor liabili-
ty.  Part IV analyzes the Stoneridge decision in detail and argues that 
the scope of liability for secondary actors remains undefined because 
the Court did not establish a framework for presuming reliance in 
secondary actor cases.  Part V explains why existing tests for imputing 
reliance and attaching liability to secondary actors are unworkable in 
light of Stoneridge.  Part VI proposes a test for imputing reliance in the 
secondary-actor context.  Part VII evaluates arguments for judicial 
recognition of the proposed test.  Finally, Part VIII evaluates argu-
ments against the proposed test. 
 
 10 The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 492. 
 11 Chrisman, supra note 1, at 878. 
 12 Seth S. Gomm, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and the Supreme Court’s Attempt to Determine 
the Issue of Scheme Liability, 61 ARK. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (2009).  
 13 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD 
FROM THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934  
THROUGH CENTRAL BANK 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The intensely speculative and highly leveraged securities trading 
of the 1920s and the stock market crash of 1929 prompted calls for 
increased regulation of the securities markets and more rigorous pro-
tections for investors.
14
  As part of a comprehensive effort to establish 
a regulatory scheme for the banking and securities industries,
15
 Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Exchange Act of 1934 into law.  
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act affords individual investors broad 
rights and protections: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . 
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such  rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors.
16
 
Pursuant to § 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) to 
make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading; or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty.
17
 
The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 do not offer an enumerated 
list of violations.  Thus, it appears that Congress left to the courts the 
role of establishing parameters for the scope of liability.
18
  The com-
mittee reports of the House and Senate shed little light on who 
 
 14 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 18, at 2–5 (J.S. 
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, eds., 1973). 
 15 Id. 
 16 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 18 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 (1976) (“The legislative reports 
do not address the scope of § 10(b) or its catchall function directly.”). 
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should be liable for violations of Rule 10b-5, except to say that liabili-
ty would not attach without proof of scienter.
19
  With reference to § 
10(b), the Senate Report merely stated that “‘[i]n addition to the dis-
cretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative author-
ity, effective regulation must include several clear statutory provisions 
reinforced by penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative 
and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no 
useful function.’”
20
  The Court has concluded that “[t]he [Senate] 
Report therefore reveals with respect to the specified practices, an 
overall congressional intent to prevent ‘manipulative and deceptive 
practices which . . . fulfill no useful function’ and to create private ac-
tions for damages stemming from ‘illicit practices,’ where the defen-
dant has not acted in good faith.” 
21
  The Court further noted that its 
conclusions about the Senate Report were consistent with the House 
Report on the Exchange Act.
22
  Presumably, Congress did not con-
template the issues of secondary and primary liability with which the 
courts must grapple today. 
In the decades following the Great Depression, however, the 
courts would begin to define the extent to which private investors 
could hold violators of Rule 10b-5 accountable.  The Supreme Court 
held in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Banker’s Life & Casual-
ty Co.
23
 that Manhattan Casualty Company could hold its controlling 
shareholder and his collaborators liable under Rule 10b-5 for execut-
ing a scheme to purchase the corporation using the corporation’s 
own money.
24
  The Court thereby recognized an implied private right 
of action against violators of Rule 10b-5.
25
  The Court stated that “the 
fact that the fraud was perpetrated by an officer of Manhattan and his 
outside collaborators is irrelevant to our problem” and citied § 10(b), 
which states that “any person” can be held liable for engaging in de-
ceptive acts in connection with the sale of a security.
26
 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 204–05 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 6 (1934)). 
 21 Id. at 206 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 10–11, 20–21 (1934)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
 24 Id. at 7–9. 
 25 Id. at 13 n.9. 
 26 Id. at 10. 
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B. A Broad Scope of Liability Emerges in the Courts: Liability for Those 
Who Merely Aid and Abet Violations of Rule 10b-5 
Courts broadly interpreted the implied private right of action to 
include suits against those who aid and abet violations of Rule 10b-5.  
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,
27
 the plaintiffs sued 
defendant Midwestern for aiding and abetting their stockbroker, Do-
bich Securities, in its fraudulent activities.
28
  Dobich failed to deliver 
to plaintiffs their stock in Midwestern and used their stock purchase 
money as working capital for speculation.
29
  Plaintiffs who inquired 
about the status of their stock certificates with Midwestern received 
letters from Midwestern advising them to notify Dobich Securities of 
their concerns before reporting the missing stock certificates to the 
Indiana Securities Commission.
30
  Midwestern did this even though it 
was aware of Dobich’s violations of securities laws.
31
  Effectively, this 
letter ensured that there would be a delay in notifying the Indiana 
Securities Commission of Dobich’s actions.
32
  The U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Indiana held that Midwestern could be 
found liable under § 10(b) as an aider and abettor.
33
  The court rea-
soned that even though congressional amendments to codify aider-
and-abettor liability under § 10(b) had never become law, aider-and-
abettor liability could still be found by applying tort principals to the 
broad and remedial purpose of the Exchange Act.
34
  On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and found aider-
and-abettor liability cognizable under § 10(b).
35
 
The line of cases establishing a broad scope of liability under § 
10(b) gave rise to a three-prong test for aider-and-abettor liability.
36
  
The first prong of the aider-and-abettor liability test required a plain-
tiff to show a securities violation by the primary party (the issuer of 
 
 27 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (Brennan I), overruled by Cent. Bank of Den-
ver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 28 Id. at 675. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 152–53 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(Brennan II), overruled by Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164.  
 31 Id. at 151. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Brennan I, 259 F. Supp. at 676–81. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Brennan II, 417 F.2d at 154 (“It is our view that the district court was correct in 
concluding that Midwestern’s acquiescence through silence in the fraudulent con-
duct of Dobich combined with its affirmative acts was a form of aiding and abetting 
cognizable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
 36 See IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).  
WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:17 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1817 
the securities).
37
  The second prong required a plaintiff to show that 
the aider and abettor had knowledge of the securities violation of the 
primary violator; this satisfied the scienter requirement of securities 
fraud.
38
  The third prong required a plaintiff to show that the aider 
and abettor contributed substantial assistance to the achievement of 
the violation.
39
  This test for aiding and abetting liability reveals that 
in the decades following the passage of the Exchange Act, the courts 
broadly defined the scope of liability under § 10(b) to include liabili-
ty for aiding and abetting primary violators of Rule 10b-5.  A broad 
scope of liability, however, would not remain in force for long. 
C. Narrowing the Scope of Liability Under § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank presented a para-
digm shift in the judiciary’s approach to defining the scope of liability 
under § 10(b) by eliminating aider-and-abettor liability and narrow-
ing the scope of liability for secondary actors.
40
  Central Bank con-
cerned the sale of bonds by the Colorado Springs Stetson Hills Public 
Building Authority for which Central Bank served as an indenture 
trustee.
41
  Under the terms of the indenture agreement, the bonds 
had to be secured by landowner assessment liens, and the land sub-
ject to the liens had to be worth 160% of the bonds’ outstanding 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 922–23.  The Second Circuit held that recklessness satisfied the scienter 
requirement where the aider and abettor owed a fiduciary duty to the defrauded par-
ty.  Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).  Where 
the aider and abettor owed no fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, however, the 
Second Circuit held that the scienter requirement was more stringent and the assis-
tance rendered had to be both substantial and knowing.  Edwards & Hanly v. Wells 
Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 39 IIT, 619 F.2d at 922.  With respect to this third prong, certain courts refused to 
impose liability when the substantial assistance consisted of inaction except where a 
duty to disclose existed.  Id. at 925–26; Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 
1971).  Other courts took the view that inaction alone could constitute substantial 
assistance even without an independent duty to disclose, provided that there was a 
conscious intention to forward the violation.  IIT, 619 F.2d at 927; Edwards & Hanly, 
602 F.2d at 484–85; Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975).  
 40 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 191 (1994). 
 41 Id. at 167.  An indenture trustee is a “third party administrator” of a debt con-
tract.  THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.1, at 668–69 (6th 
ed. 2009).  The trustee is usually a bank that acts as the agent of the public bond 
holders.  Id. 
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principal and interest.
42
  After receiving an appraisal in 1988 that 
stated that land values had gone almost unchanged from 1986 to 
1988, the senior underwriter for the bonds expressed concern to 
Central Bank that the bank was using an outdated appraisal and that 
the 160% test was not being met because property values were declin-
ing in the Colorado Springs area.
43
  Central Bank’s in-house appraiser 
concluded that the 1988 appraisal was too optimistic and that an in-
dependent appraiser should be hired to examine the appraisal.
44
  
Central Bank decided to delay the outside review of the appraisal un-
til the end of the year.
45
  Before the outside appraisal was completed, 
however, the building authority defaulted on the bonds.
46
 
After the default on the bonds, First Interstate Bank of Denver 
and Jack K. Naber sued the bonding authority, the underwriters, and 
Central Bank, among others, for violations of Rule 10b-5, alleging 
that Central Bank was secondarily liable for misrepresentation of the 
value of the bond collateral.
47
  The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of Central Bank.
48
  
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reciting the requirements for a Rule 10b-
5 aiding-and-abetting claim.
49
  The Tenth Circuit found that Central 
Bank could be held liable as an aider and abettor on the basis of the 
facts presented.
50
  Specifically, the court opined that “a reasonable 
trier of fact could conclude that Central Bank had rendered substan-
tial assistance by delaying the independent review of the appraisal” 
and that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether Central Bank was reckless as to a primary violation of Rule 
10b-5.
51
 
 
 42 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 167–68. 
 45 Id. at 168.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.  
 49 Id. (citing First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898–903 
(10th Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).  The Tenth Circuit set forth the following re-
quirements for an aiding and abetting claim: “(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) 
recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and 
(3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.”  Id.  
 50 Id. at 168–69. 
 51 Id. at 169.  
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In what has proven to be a watershed decision,
52
 the Supreme 
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and, basing its decision on several 
grounds, eliminated the implied private right of action against aiders 
and abettors.
53
  First, the Court held that § 10(b) does not include an 
express private right of action against aiders and abettors and that 
Congress had failed to make aiding and abetting grounds for liability 
in amendments to the Exchange Act.
54
  The Court also noted that 
while bills adding aider-and-abettor liability were introduced in Con-
gress in 1957, 1959, and 1960, all of these bills failed.
55
  Second, the 
Court found that aider-and-abettor liability was untenable because a 
critical element for recovery was missing from the aider-and-abettor 
liability framework: reliance.
56
  The Court concluded that aider-and-
abettor liability allowed plaintiffs to hold defendants liable for aiding 
and abetting without showing that they relied on the defendant’s ac-
tions in making their investment decisions.
57
  Third, the Court po-
sited that imposing aider-and-abettor liability meant attaching liability 
to parties who do not commit violations of Rule 10b-5.
58
  While § 
10(b) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person directly or in-
directly” to commit fraud,
59
 the Court’s principal objection to aider-
and-abettor liability was that it “reaches persons who do not engage in 
the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those 
who do.”
60
  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, thus reasoned 
that because liability extends only to those who commit deliberately 
manipulative or deceptive actions and not to the negligent conduct 
of the type identified in this case, aiders and abettors, like Central 
Bank, should not be held liable.
61
 
But to read Central Bank as closing the door on secondary liabili-
ty altogether would be a mistake.
62
  While mere aiding and abetting 
cannot be the basis for liability in a private right of action, this “does 
 
 52 See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) and 
the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 667, 667 (2004) (discussing how Central Bank constituted a “major upheaval 
in securities law”). 
 53 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 54 Id. at 186. 
 55 Id. at 186–87. 
 56 Id. at 180. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 176. 
 59 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 60 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
 61 Id. at 177.  
 62 Id. at 191. 
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not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always 
free from liability under the securities Acts.”
63
  In fact, “[a]ny person 
or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a 
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) 
on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies” can be held liable 
as if he were a primary violator under Rule 10b-5, provided that he 
satisfies all of the elements of primary liability.
64
  The Court said that 
it could not hold Central Bank liable because it “did not commit a 
manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of § 10(b).”
65
  Thus, 
if Central Bank, as a secondary actor, had committed a deceptive or 
manipulative act, it could have been held liable under the statute if it 
had met the requirements of a primary violation of Rule 10b-5.  
Courts should apply the same logic to other secondary actors as well: 
a violation of Rule 10b-5 by a secondary actor should be grounds for 
liability in a private cause of action provided that the secondary actor 
satisfies all of the necessary elements of a securities fraud claim.
66
 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY POST-CENTRAL 
BANK: A BRIGHT-LINE RULE VS. SCHEME LIABILITY 
In the years following the Central Bank decision, courts, grap-
pling with the issue of attaching liability to secondary actors in private 
causes of action, developed divergent approaches to dealing with very 
similar instances of deceptive conduct by secondary actors.
67
  Some 
courts opted for a substantial-participation test, which attaches liabili-
ty to secondary actors who are substantially involved in the produc-
tion of misstatements made by primary violators of Rule 10b-5.
68
  Out 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 The basic elements of a securities fraud claim are: 
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission);  
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;  
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security;  
(4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities mar-
kets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction causation”;  
(5) economic loss; and  
(6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between the material mi-
srepresentation and the loss. 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 67 See Eric Berry, Note, Stoneridge and the Short-Lived Experiment of Scheme Liability, 
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 355, 363 (2007) (“The boundary between primary and secondary 
violators remain[ed] a matter of dispute between different circuits.”). 
 68 Chrisman, supra note 1, at 860; see also, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 
F.3d 1057, 1061–63 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that substantial involvement in the 
preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for liability and that signing consti-
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of the substantial-participation test grew the concept of scheme liabil-
ity articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner 
Inc.
69
  Under this test, a secondary actor is held liable for purposefully 
committing deceptive acts, such as drafting misleading SEC filings, as 
part of a scheme to defraud investors.
70
  Other courts opted for a 
more stringent, bright-line rule, which requires plaintiffs to attribute 
a particular public, material misrepresentation to the secondary actor 
before attaching liability to that secondary actor under § 10(b) (i.e., 
the public statement must identify the secondary actor for liability to 
attach).
71
  At the same time, the SEC offered the creator standard as a 
compromise between the bright-line rule, on the one hand, and the 
substantial participation and scheme liability approaches on the oth-
er.
72
  Under the creator standard, a secondary actor is liable if he can 
be characterized as an author of the misleading statement, as op-
posed to a mere participant in its drafting.
73
  Judicial acceptance of 
the creator standard, however, appears to be limited compared to the 
judicial acceptance of the other tests for secondary-actor liability.
74
  
 
tutes substantial involvement); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 
319, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that where the secondary actor’s participation in 
the preparation of a misstatement is substantial enough, the secondary actor will be 
treated as having made the statement, and the investors may be deemed to have re-
lied on the misstatement even though the statement is not publicly attributed to the 
secondary actor); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(holding that any participant in a course of business or scheme involving the prepa-
ration of misstatements can be held liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 69 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008). 
 70 For a detailed discussion of the origins and growth of the scheme liability con-
cept, see Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Note, Scheme Liability: Rule 10b-5(a) and Sec-
ondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183, 205–34 (2008). 
 71 See, e.g., Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 476 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(declining to adopt the substantial-participation test and holding that the misstate-
ment must be publicly attributed to the actor for liability to attach); Regents of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that secondary actors’ participation in transactions, regardless of their pur-
pose or effect, does not give rise to liability absent a public misstatement by the sec-
ondary actor); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the misstatement must be attributable to the secondary actor for liabili-
ty to attach); Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that the misstatement must be attributable to the secondary actor at the time of 
dissemination for liability to attach). 
 72 Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the 
Supreme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 22 
(2008) (“The SEC’s creator standard attempted to forge a compromise between the 
bright line standard’s limited attribution rule and the specter of unlimited liability 
arguably inherent in the application of the substantial participation standard.”). 
 73 Id. at 23–24.  
 74 The Third Circuit in Klein v. Boyd, No. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WL 55245 (3d 
Cir. 1998), adopted the SEC’s creator standard, but its decision was later vacated by 
WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:17 PM 
1822 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1811 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s scheme-liability concept, the substantial-
participation test, and the bright-line rule dominated pre-Stoneridge 
jurisprudence. 
A. Scheme Liability: Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc. 
Under the scheme-liability framework enunciated in Simpson, 
secondary actors who engage in deceptive acts can be liable if they 
participate in a scheme to defraud investors, which results in misre-
presentations being made to investors.
75
  Simpson, like so many other 
cases, involved fraudulent transactions designed to inflate revenues.
76
  
Defendant Homestore.com would identify a third-party corporation 
that was thinly capitalized and in need of revenues to facilitate an ini-
tial public offering of its stock.
77
  Homestore.com would then agree to 
purchase either shares in that company for inflated values or services 
or products that Homestore.com did not need.
78
  The third party 
would then agree to purchase advertising from AOL for nearly the 
entire amount Homestore.com was paying it.
79
  The money thus 
flowed from the third party to AOL, which took a commission and 
then shared the sham advertising revenues with Homestore.com.
80
 
The Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether the sec-
ondary-actor defendants had committed a primary violation by facili-
tating Homestore.com’s fraud, but it ultimately decided that they had 
not.
81
  In considering this question, however, the court outlined a 
framework for finding secondary actors liable as primary actors.
82
  
The court first reviewed the basic elements of a securities fraud claim 
found in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.
83
  The court then pro-
ceeded to outline the requirements for scheme liability within the 
 
the court’s decision to grant an en banc rehearing.  Schanbaum, supra note 70, at 
202–03.  Nonetheless, the test would later be adopted in a Northern District of Geor-
gia decision in Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 
1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998), and by the Southern District of Texas in In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 590–91 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  Id. at 203–
04. 
 75 Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), va-
cated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008). 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. (quoting In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 
(C.D. Cal. 2003)).  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1044. 
 81 Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046.  
 82 Id. at 1046–50.  
 83 544 U.S. 336 (2005); see supra note 66.  
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purview of § 10(b).
84
  Two of these requirements are particularly 
germane to the argument: secondary actors must engage in conduct 
with the principal purpose and effect of creating a material misrepre-
sentation as to the value of securities, and the investor must demon-
strate reliance on the secondary actor’s acts. 
The first requirement for scheme liability is that “the defendant 
must have engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and ef-
fect of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the 
scheme.”
85
  The court distinguished the “principal purpose” prong of 
scheme liability from the requirement of scienter.
86
  Scienter requires 
strong “evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”; it 
goes to the defendant’s state of mind.
87
  On the other hand, the 
“principal purpose and effect test” looks to the nature of the defen-
dant’s conduct and asks whether it was sufficiently deceptive for lia-
bility.
88
  In particular, the court looks to whether the defendant’s 
conduct involved an illegitimate transaction that may form the basis 
of a primary violation of Rule 10b-5.
89
  In this case, the court held that 
AOL Time Warner and the other defendants ultimately could not be 
held liable because their conduct was not sufficiently deceptive within 
the meaning of the Exchange Act, as the dealings in which they had 
engaged were, on their face, legitimate business transactions.
90
 
The second requirement for scheme liability is that the plaintiff-
investor must show reliance on the deceptive act of the secondary 
party.
91
  Where the defendant has no duty to disclose information to 
investors, courts will presume reliance on a defendant’s misstate-
ments if the misstatements are disseminated into an “efficient mar-
ket.”
92
  The fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance “‘applies to all 
three clauses of Rule 10b-5: (1) scheme to defraud, (2) misrepresen-
 
 84 Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046. 
 85 Id. at 1048. 
 86 Id. at 1048 n.5. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1052–55. 
 91 Id. at 1051. 
 92 Id.  “Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposition has con-
cluded that where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an 
impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs 
on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.”  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
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tation or omission, and (3) fraudulent course of business.’”
93
  There-
fore, the court held that reliance will be presumed where a misrepre-
sentation “necessarily resulted from the scheme and the defendant’s 
conduct” and “was disseminated into an efficient market and was re-
flected in the market price.”
94
  The Ninth Circuit found that a plain-
tiff could show reliance on the deceptive acts of a secondary actor 
even though no public misrepresentations are directly attributable to 
that secondary actor.
95
 
B. The Bright-Line Rule: Regents of the University of California 
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.
96
 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit holding in Simpson, the Fifth 
Circuit held in Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston (USA), Inc. (“Credit Suisse”) that a secondary actor must actually 
make a public, material representation to be found liable under § 
10(b).
97
  Much like Simpson, Credit Suisse involved partnerships and 
transactions engineered specifically for the purpose of inflating reve-
nue and taking liabilities off the books.
98
  In this case, Enron enlisted 
Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch, and other investment banks in what has 
become known as the “Nigerian Barges Transaction.”
99
  Enron wanted 
to liquidate its interest in electricity-generating barges off the coast of 
Nigeria in late 1999 so that it could increase its revenue for the quar-
ter and meet Wall Street expectations.
100
  Enron solicited Merrill 
Lynch to enter into a transaction pursuant to which Merrill Lynch 
would purchase the barges and Enron would pay Merrill a premium 
and repurchase the barges within the following six months.
101
  Merrill 
purchased the barges, and Enron bought them back at a premium a 
few months later.
102
  Enron then recorded the transaction, not as a 
 
 93 Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051 (quoting 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7:469 (2d ed. 
2006)). 
 94 Id. at 1052. 
 95 Id. 
 96 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 97 Compare Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049 (articulating the rule that a public misstate-
ment need not be attributed to the secondary actor to impose liability), with Credit 
Suisse, 482 F.3d at 385–86 (articulating the rule that absent a duty to disclose, a pub-
lic misstatement must be attributed to a secondary actor to impose liability). 
 98 Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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loan, as would have been proper, but as a sale in order to boost its 
1999 year end revenues.
103
  The plaintiffs alleged that the banks knew 
that the purpose of these transactions was to raise revenue figures, 
which would in turn increase the rate of executive compensation.
104
 
The court in Credit Suisse noted that the U.S. District Court of 
the Southern District of Texas held that “rule 10b-5(a)’s prohibition 
of ‘any scheme . . . to defraud’ gives rise to joint and several liability 
for defendants who commit individual acts of deception in further-
ance of such a scheme” on the theory that the banks had a duty not 
to engage in a fraudulent scheme.
105
  The Fifth Circuit reversed the 
district court decision and held that the plaintiffs failed to plead re-
liance regarding the defendant’s deceptive acts.
106
  The court rea-
soned that neither the presumption of reliance based on a duty to 
disclose nor the presumption of reliance based on the theory of 
fraud-on-the-market applied to the facts of the case.
107
  First, the in-
vestment banks’ actions were not deceptive within the meaning of § 
10(b) because the banks had no affirmative duty to disclose to 
Enron’s investors.
108
  Second, the court argued that the district court’s 
finding of reliance based on a theory of fraud-on-the-market was 
wrong because “[t]o qualify for the [fraud-on-the-market] presump-
tion [of reliance] . . . a plaintiff must not only indicate that a market 
is efficient, but also must allege that the defendant made public and 
material misrepresentations; i.e., the type of fraud on which an effi-
cient market may be presumed to rely.”
109
  Because the defendant 
banks in Credit Suisse only participated in the transactions and did not 
make deceptive public misstatements on which the investors could 
have relied, they could not be held liable under § 10(b).
110
 
This Comment is particularly concerned with the court’s hold-
ing with respect to fraud-on-the-market reliance because the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the concept of reliance articulated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Simpson.
111
  Instead, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning in In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litiga-
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377. 
 105 Id. at 378. 
 106 Id. at 385.  
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 386. 
 109 Id. at 385–86. 
 110 Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 388–90. 
 111 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:17 PM 
1826 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1811 
tion
112
 in which the court held that a public misstatement by a second-
ary actor is necessary for finding that secondary actor liable.
113
  The 
Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit applied different rules to very sim-
ilar fact patterns.
114
  Thus, in examining Stoneridge, the question is 
whether the Supreme Court actually resolved the disagreement 
among the circuits over attaching liability to secondary actors in cases 
where the secondary actors have no affirmative duty to disclose their 
deception.  This Comment takes the position that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stoneridge has not resolved the disagreement; in 
fact, it has only further muddied the waters. 
IV. STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.L.C. V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA, 
INC. AND SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY 
A. The Facts and the History 
Stoneridge involved a class-action lawsuit brought by shareholders 
against Charter Communications and two of its equipment suppliers, 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, alleging that they had participated in 
transactions which inflated revenue and cash flow statements.
115
  In 
late 2000, despite other efforts to manipulate its financial results—
including the delayed reporting of terminated customers, improper 
capitalization of costs, and manipulation of billing cut-off dates to in-
flate its revenues—Charter’s revenue was still fifteen- to twenty-
million dollars below Wall Street estimates for revenue and cash 
flow.
116
  To help make up the revenue shortfall, Charter decided to 
modify its existing contractual arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta 
and Motorola which both sold Charter the digital cable converter 
boxes used by its cable subscribers.
117
  Charter arranged to overpay 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola twenty dollars for each converter box 
it purchased through the end of the year with the understanding that 
 
 112 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 113 Id. at 992 (“Any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be 
made a fraudulent statement or omission, or who does not directly engage in mani-
pulative securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abetting and can-
not be held liable under § 10(b) or any subpart of Rule 10b-5.”). 
 114 Compare supra note 94 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 and accom-
panying text. 
 115 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 
(2008).  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
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they would return the overpayment by purchasing advertisements 
from Charter.
118
 
To mislead its accountant into certifying the revenue figures, in-
cluding the fake advertising revenue, Charter requested that Scientif-
ic-Atlanta send documents stating that Scientific-Atlanta had in-
creased production costs for the converter boxes by twenty dollars 
per box, a request with which Scientific-Atlanta complied.
119
  Charter 
also agreed in a written contract to purchase a specific number of set-
top boxes from Motorola with the expectation that it would not take 
delivery of all the boxes and with the express provision that it would 
pay Motorola liquidated damages of twenty dollars per unit.
120
  Scien-
tific-Atlanta and Motorola then signed contracts with Charter to pur-
chase advertising from Charter at a price higher than fair value, 
which represented a return to Charter of the twenty dollar overpay-
ment it made for each set-top box.
121
  Charter backdated the advertis-
ing agreements to give the impression that they were negotiated sep-
arately from the agreements to overpay for the converter boxes and 
therefore, represented two separate transactions, which was necessary 
to allow Charter to record the advertising payments as revenue on its 
financial statements.
122
  Notably, however, Scientific-Atlanta and Mo-
torola played no role in preparing or disseminating Charter’s mis-
leading financial statements, and their own financial statements 
booked the transactions as a wash in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.
123
 
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
124
  
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Central Bank provided the courts 
with three guiding principles.  The first is that a private plaintiff “may 
not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by 
the text of § 10(b).”
125
  Secondly, the court held that “[a] device . . . is 
not ‘deceptive,’ within the meaning of § 10b, absent some misstate-
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 767. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 173 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ment or failure to disclose by one who has a duty to disclose.”
126
  
Thirdly, the court ruled that the term “manipulative” in Rule 10b-5 
has a limited contextual meaning.
127
  Applying these principals to 
Stoneridge, the Eighth Circuit held that neither Scientific-Atlanta nor 
Motorola could have engaged in a deceptive act because neither 
made a public misstatement and neither was under a duty to disclose 
information about Charter’s financial health.
128
  Therefore, both were 
merely aiders and abettors and could not be held liable.
129
  Because 
the Eighth Circuit’s ruling reflected the split among the circuits over 
“when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to recover 
from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a 
duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate § 10(b),” 
the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case.
130
 
B. The Key Issue Identified by the Supreme Court in Stoneridge: 
Reliance 
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiffs in Stoneridge could 
not attach liability to Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, the Supreme 
Court focused on whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the reliance re-
quirement (i.e. whether the investors’ reliance on the acts and state-
ments of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola could be presumed even 
though neither of them had made public misstatements).
131
  The 
plaintiffs argued that Charter’s public issuance of a misleading finan-
cial statement was “a natural and expected consequence of respon-
dents’ deceptive acts” and that “Charter’s auditor would not have 
been fooled, and the financial statement would have been a more ac-
curate reflection of Charter’s financial condition” but for the assis-
tance provided by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.
132
  Essentially, they 
argued that reliance can be found if the secondary actor is a “but for” 
cause of the dissemination of a deceptive misstatement. 
 
 126 Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1977)). 
 127 Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476 (holding that manipulation is a term 
of art that “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged 
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activi-
ty”)). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 767 
(2008).  Compare supra note 94 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 and ac-
companying text. 
 131 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 132 Id. at 770. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they 
relied on the deceptive acts of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.
133
  
Generally speaking, to find that the investors in Charter stock relied 
on Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola’s deceptive acts, the investors 
would have had to show “the ‘requisite causal connection between a 
defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.’”
134
  The Su-
preme Court explained that there are two ways to establish the causal 
connection and demonstrate reliance.
135
  First, if a party with a duty to 
disclose omits a material fact, the investor to whom the duty was owed 
does not need to provide specific proof of reliance because reliance is 
presumed in such situations.
136
  Second, reliance is presumed under 
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine when material misstatements be-
come public.
137
  Concluding that the defendants had no duty to dis-
close, the Court focused on the second method of satisfying the re-
liance requirement: the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance.
138
 
The Court found that the defendants’ deceptive acts, namely 
taking part in the sham transactions and drafting documents to codi-
fy those transactions, and the public statements made by Charter 
were “too remote” from plaintiffs’ losses to satisfy the reliance re-
quirement via a fraud-on-the-market presumption.
139
  The majority 
posited that investors do not rely on the transactions reflected in fi-
nancial statements and that such a concept of reliance would result in 
attaching liability to the entire marketplace in which the company is-
suing securities does business.
140
  The Court concluded that “nothing 
respondents did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to record 
the transactions as it did” and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not satisfy 
the reliance requirement.
141
  At the same time, however, the Court 
explained that its conclusion should not be “read to suggest there 
must be a specific oral or written statement before there could be lia-
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 769 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)). 
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 
(1972)). 
 137 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 247). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 770. 
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bility under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,” and it explicitly noted that 
“[c]onduct itself can be deceptive.”
142
 
C. The Scope of Secondary-Actor Liability Remains Undefined: The 
Supreme Court Did Not Close the Door on Secondary-Actor Liability 
Although it restricted the scope of secondary-actor liability out-
lined in Central Bank, the Supreme Court did not clearly resolve the 
dispute between the circuits by simply choosing the bright-line rule 
over the scheme liability concept or one of the other tests.  By saying 
that “specific oral or written [mis]statement[s]” are not necessary for 
a finding of liability,
143
 the Supreme Court essentially refused to 
uphold a key feature of the of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Credit 
Suisse and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Charter Communications.
144
  
At the same time, however, the Court said that it could not hold a 
secondary actor liable unless its deceptive acts made a primary actor’s 
statement “necessary or inevitable” (i.e., not “too remote”).
145
  Impli-
cit in this statement is the conclusion that if Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola’s actions in Stoneridge had made it “necessary or inevitable 
for Charter to record the transactions as it did,” the reliance re-
quirement would have been satisfied and liability would have at-
tached to their actions.
146
  The Court’s language thus supports the 
proposition that secondary-actor/scheme liability still exists in some, 
albeit a limited, form.
147
  As one commentator wrote, 
[t]hus the answer to the question certified for review—whether 
an injured investor “may rely upon § 10(b) to recover from a par-
 
 142 Id. at 769. 
 143 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 144 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 
987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 145 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See DAVID WILTENBERG, SUPREME COURT’S LATEST WORD ON PRIVATE SECURITIES 
FRAUD CLAIMS: STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 4–
5 (LEXIS 2008), 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1861 (“But what if, in some alternate Stone-
ridge, information about the deceptive acts actually had been communicated – could 
such acts be ‘deceptive’ for § 10(b) purposes and thus the predicate for a primary 
violation?  This was the question the Eighth Circuit had answered in the negative and 
which the Supreme Court was not compelled to reach.  Having noted that the sup-
pliers’ ‘course of conduct included both oral and written statements, such as the 
backdated contracts,’ the Court could have based its affirmance on the absence of 
reliance alone.  Justice Kennedy nevertheless addressed the question squarely, and 
squarely rejected as ‘erroneous’ the view impliedly adopted by the Eighth Circuit, in 
language destined to be quoted in future cases: ‘Conduct itself can be deceptive.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
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ty that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to 
disclose but does participate in a scheme”—appears to be “Yes, 
provided investors actually or presumptively rely upon the party’s 
conduct.”
148
 
The statutes and accompanying rules buttress the theory that 
liability can still be attached to secondary actors who do not issue 
public misstatements.  First, reading the Stoneridge decision along with 
the statutory language found in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provides fur-
ther evidence in support of the proposition that the Supreme Court 
could not have intended to make a public misstatement a prerequi-
site for liability.
149
  Only Rule 10b-5(b) makes a misstatement grounds 
for liability; the other parts of the rule do not.
150
  Rule 10b-5(a), to-
gether with § 10(b), makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly . . . to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”
151
  Rule 
10b-5(c) makes it unlawful “to engage in any act, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any per-
son.”
152
  A simple reading of the statute and the rule demonstrates 
that a misstatement is not the only basis for liability.
153
  As one com-
mentator asked, “Why else, in fact, would there be subsections (a) 
and (c) if not meant to cover some acts different, and totally apart, 
from (b)?”
154
  He went on to argue that “[s]urely, ‘indirectly’ means 
something.”
155
 
Second, when § 10(b) says “any person, directly or indirectly,” it 
implicitly brings secondary actors within the scope of liability.
156
  In 
light of Central Bank, which held that secondary-actor liability exists, 
reading the statute and the accompanying rules otherwise would be 
erroneous.
157
  In Stoneridge, Justice Kennedy wrote that misstatements 
are not necessary for liability and that “[c]onduct itself can be decep-
 
 148 Id. at 5. 
 149 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2010). 
 150 Id. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c). 
 151 § 240.10b-5(a) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 152 § 240.10b-5(c). 
 153 See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[N]either the SEC nor this 
Court has ever held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a par-
ticular security in order to run afoul of the act.”). 
 154 Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge – Escape From Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active, 
Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 182 (2008). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (emphasis added). 
 157 See discussion supra Part II.C for an analysis of the Central Bank decision. 
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tive.”
158
  Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in conjunction with the 
statute, the accompanying SEC rules, and the existing case law dem-
onstrate that liability should still attach to a secondary actor who per-
petrates a fraud by engaging in deceptive acts even if those acts do 
not include the actual issuance of a misstatement into the public do-
main.
159
  With the door not completely closed on secondary-actor lia-
bility, the judiciary and investors alike are left with the following ques-
tion: when are the deceptive acts of a secondary actor not “too 
remote” from the losses incurred by the investors to impute reliance 
and attach liability to that secondary actor? 
D. The Open Question: How Do Post-Stoneridge Plaintiffs Satisfy the 
Reliance Requirement? 
The Court’s reasoning in Stoneridge indicates that it was con-
cerned that an overly broad concept of reliance would result in liabil-
ity attaching to a multitude of parties engaged in ordinary business 
transactions with the securities issuer.
160
  The majority clearly does not 
want courts to cast a wide net, ensnaring legitimate businessmen into 
a maelstrom of liability when the links between the deceptive conduct 
and the investors’ losses are far too attenuated.
161
  If, however, the 
Court’s answer to the question is that liability can be attached only 
when public misstatements are the necessary and inevitable result of 
the secondary actor’s deceptive acts, the lower courts are left to de-
termine the sets of factual circumstances under which deceptive acts 
make a public misstatement necessary or inevitable. 
In requiring that the public misstatements must be the necessary 
or inevitable result of the secondary actor’s deceptive acts, the Su-
preme Court has left a finding of reliance difficult to envision.  
Commentators have noted that “it is difficult to conceive how the test 
could ever be satisfied short of an actor’s either making false state-
ments, failing to make statements it was obliged to make, or engaging 
in traditionally proscribed market manipulation that is the equivalent 
 
 158 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 
(2008). 
 159 See Sinai, supra note 154, at 181–82 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 651 (1997)). 
 160 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770 (“Were this concept of reliance to be adopted, 
the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing 
company does business . . . .”). 
 161 See id. 
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thereof.”
162
  Only two days after the Supreme Court issued the Stone-
ridge decision, however, the lead plaintiffs in Credit Suisse petitioned 
the Court for a writ of certiorari in hopes that the Court would clarify 
the scope of secondary liability in their favor, but the Court denied 
certiorari.
163
 
The Credit Suisse petition serves to highlight the unsettled nature 
of the law with respect to secondary-actor liability.  The lead plaintiffs 
in Credit Suisse argued, 
[F]ar from warranting a denial of certiorari, this Court’s decision 
in Stoneridge demonstrates critical differences between Enron and 
Stoneridge—differences that warrant a grant of certiorari to deter-
mine § 10(b)’s scope not in the context of ordinary business 
transactions addressed by Stoneridge, but in the context of fraud 
perpetrated by financial professionals engaged in fraudulent deal-
ings in our securities markets.
164
 
In an attempt to contrast the Stoneridge investors’ lack of reliance 
on suspicious transactions in the marketplace for goods and services 
with transactions taking place in the investment sphere, the lead 
plaintiff’s brief further noted that Stoneridge does not rule out liability 
for fraud by financial professionals that is directed at securities mar-
kets (e.g., schemes designed to inflate a company’s quarterly and 
year-end revenue figures).
165
  The plaintiff argued that the scope of 
secondary-actor liability in Stoneridge should be read to include “an 
underwriter who knowingly underwrites a fraudulent offering and de-
liberately disseminates fraudulent offering documents, selling securi-
ties to the public.”
166
  Implicit in the plaintiff’s argument in the Credit 
Suisse petition for writ of certiorari is the conclusion that the reliance 
requirement is satisfied and liability should be found in cases where 
secondary actors are intimately involved in activities closely related to 
the issuance and sale of securities.  After all, it would seem reasonable 
to conclude that investors do in fact rely on the integrity of those who 
play vital roles in drafting financial documents and who do just about 
everything with respect to the creation of the documents except at-
tach their names to or directly disseminate such documents.
167
  In any 
 
 162 EVAN A. DAVIS, MITCHELL A. LOWENTHAL & NANCY I. RUSKIN, DAVIS, LOWENTHAL, 
& RUSKIN ON STONERIDGE INVESTMENT LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 5 (LEXIS 
2008), 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1880. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Supplemental Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (No. 06-1341). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 3. 
 167 See discussion infra Part VII. 
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case, the petition for a writ of certiorari in the Credit Suisse case was 
likely only the first in what will amount to a multitude of attempts by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to get the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of 
secondary liability and, more specifically, to address the circums-
tances under which the reliance requirement would be deemed satis-
fied in secondary actor cases.
168
 
V. THE EXISTING TESTS FOR SECONDARY-ACTOR LIABILITY DO NOT 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS STONERIDGE’S CONCERNS ABOUT RELIANCE 
Existing tests for imposing liability on secondary actors are in-
structive, but they do not provide a framework for satisfying the re-
liance requirements of Stoneridge and therefore do not avail a method 
of recovery against secondary actors.  The major tests for secondary-
actor liability—namely, the substantial-participation test, the bright-
line rule, and the creator test—are unworkable in light of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion.
169
  A plaintiff satisfying either the substantial-
participation test or the creator test will likely fail to impose liability 
on a secondary actor for lack of a causal link between the secondary 
actor’s deceptive acts and the primary actor’s misstatement on which 
the investing public is presumed to rely.
170
  Similarly, the existing con-
cept of scheme liability does not adequately address the Court’s con-
cerns about the causal relationship between the secondary actor’s in-
volvement in the fraudulent scheme and the public release of a 
misleading statement.
171
  By contrast, the bright-line rule would see-
mingly nullify secondary-actor liability altogether with its requirement 
that the plaintiff must attribute a public misstatement to the defen-
dant to impose liability for a violation of Rule 10b-5.
172
 
A. The Substantial-Participation Test Does Not Provide a Basis for Imputing 
Reliance 
The substantial-participation test implicates actors who are intri-
cately involved in the preparation of fraudulent documents “even 
though [their] participation might not lead to the [primary] actor’s 
 
 168 JAMES L. STENGEL, STEVEN J. FINK AND KRISTEN R. FOURNIER, STONERIDGE 
INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC V. SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC. 4–5 (LEXIS 2008), 2008 
EMERGING ISSUES 1881 (“It seems certain that creative plaintiffs will continue to press 
one or more variants of the scheme liability theory, using as a springboard the 
Court’s statement that ‘[c]onduct itself can be deceptive . . . .’”). 
 169 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 170 See discussion infra Part V.A–B. 
 171 See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 172 See discussion infra Part V.C. 
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actual making of the statements.”
173
  As one commentator has noted, 
the substantial-participation test employs a shifting and highly fact-
oriented determination of what constitutes substantial participation; 
many courts have applied this standard on an ad-hoc basis, which has 
thus offered little predictive value to those secondary actors who want 
to be sure that their actions are not causing the perpetration of 
fraud.
174
  Stoneridge, however, makes direct causation of the public 
misstatement a prerequisite for imputing reliance and imposing lia-
bility in the secondary actor context.
175
  The substantial-participation 
test is thus untenable in the post-Stoneridge environment because it 
would potentially impose liability on those whose deceptive conduct 
falls short of directly causing a misstatement to be made public.
176
 
B. The SEC’s Creator Test Does Not Provide a Basis for Imputing 
Reliance 
The creator test proposed by the SEC is untenable for reasons 
similar to those which make the substantial-participation test unwork-
able in the post-Stoneridge world.  Although the creator standard re-
flects an attempt by the SEC to craft a compromise “between the 
bright line standard’s limited attribution rule and the specter of un-
limited liability arguably inherent in the application of the substantial 
participation standard,” such a test would potentially impose liability 
on anyone who plays a role in authoring a public misstatement even 
though that person plays no role in its dissemination.
177
  One com-
mentator posited that “when disclosure results from the collaborative 
efforts of a number of people . . . the SEC’s creator standard fails to 
provide a workable framework for analysis.”
178
  The publication of a 
misstatement is not the necessary or inevitable result of its creation.  
Actors other than the creator of the misstatement, such as the actor 
who edits the document or the actor who offers feedback on the 
document, often determine whether the misstatement is published.
179
  
Imposing liability on the basis of someone’s status as the author of 
 
 173 Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 174 Cosenza, supra note 72, at 32–33. 
 175 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 
770 (2008); see also id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s “su-
per-causation” view of reliance). 
 176 See Cosenza, supra note 72, at 43–44 (citing Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769) (noting 
that actions in an indirect chain are too remote for imposing liability under Stone-
ridge). 
 177 Id. at 22. 
 178 Id. at 38. 
 179 Id. 
WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:17 PM 
1836 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1811 
the misstatement would thus be problematic because it would poten-
tially implicate actors who are unhinged from the causal chain and 
too far removed from the issuance of a misleading statement.  The 
creator test, therefore, runs afoul of the requirement that the sec-
ondary actor’s deceptive conduct must be causally linked to the dis-
semination of the misstatement.
180
 
C. The Bright-Line Rule Is Incompatible with Stoneridge 
Despite all of the rejoicing among those in the corporate de-
fense bar who view Stoneridge as a big win for securities fraud defen-
dants,
181
 the close reading of Stoneridge advocated by this Comment 
reveals that the bright-line rule is incompatible with the decision in 
Stoneridge.  Stoneridge, which states that it would be erroneous “to sug-
gest that there must be a specific oral or written statement before 
there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,”
182
 directly con-
flicts with the language found in cases articulating a bright-line rule 
like Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.
183
  Wright held that for the plaintiff 
to satisfy the reliance requirement and attach liability, a public miss-
tatement must be attributable to the secondary actor.
184
  For the 
Court in Stoneridge, the question is not whether there is a public miss-
tatement; that is not necessary for a finding of liability.
185
  The crucial 
question is whether the secondary actor’s deceptive acts “have the re-
quisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm” to satisfy the re-
liance requirement.
186
  Therefore, in so far as it requires the plaintiff 
to show that the secondary actor actually issued a public statement 
 
 180 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; see also id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the majority’s “super-causation” view of reliance). 
 181 WILTENBERG, supra note 147, at 1 (“The 5-3 decision, authored by Justice Ken-
nedy, has been heralded as closing the door on a wide variety of fraud claims against 
secondary actors . . . .”); see JAMES A. FANTO, JAMES FANTO ON THE “BAD APPLES” 
PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE SCANDALS 4 (LEXIS 2008) 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1817 
(“The Stoneridge decision may thus be a Pyrrhic victory for business and financial pro-
fessionals.”). 
 182 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 183 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 184 Id. (“‘[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually 
make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).  
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how 
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b)’. . 
. .  [A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a statement 
not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination.  Such a holding would 
circumvent the reliance requirements of the Act . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 185 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 186 Id. at 769.  
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him or herself, the bright-line rule is too restrictive.
187
  Such a re-
quirement does not comport with the pronouncement that “conduct 
itself can be deceptive” articulated by Justice Kennedy in Stoneridge.
188
  
In fact, such a rule is incompatible with the very existence of second-
ary-actor liability because secondary actors like lawyers, accountants, 
and investment bankers do not issue statements directly to the invest-
ing public but rather play a behind the scenes role, assisting those 
who do. 
D. The Concept of Scheme Liability Is Incompatible with Stoneridge 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Simpson, the Supreme Court in Stone-
ridge held that in cases where a secondary actor has no duty to dis-
close, reliance cannot be presumed, and thus, liability cannot be 
found simply because secondary actors purposefully engage in con-
duct that has the principal effect of creating a false appearance of 
material fact.
189
  In Stoneridge, both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
played a significant role in perpetrating the fraud on Charter inves-
tors by actively participating in the sham transactions that made the 
fraudulent misrepresentation possible.
190
  Therefore, the Stoneridge 
defendants would have been found liable under § 10(b) if the Court 
had employed the scheme-liability concept.  The Court, however, de-
termined that the plaintiffs did not rely on the defendants’ actions 
because their actions did not make the misstatement on which the 
investors relied necessary or inevitable.
191
  In the eyes of the Court, a 
sufficient causal nexus did not exist between Scientific-Atlanta’s and 
Motorola’s actions and the release of the misleading cash flow state-
ments.
192
  The concept of scheme liability based on a principal pur-
pose and effect test is thus incompatible with what Justice Steven’s 
dissenting opinion calls Stoneridge’s “super-causation” standard for re-
liance.
193
  Future plaintiffs, who simply allege that a secondary actor 
acted with the principal purpose and effect of creating a public miss-
 
 187 Schanbaum, supra note 70, at 198–99. 
 188 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 189 Compare id. at 770 (explaining that acting with the principal purpose and effect 
of creating a false appearance of material fact is insufficient to impose liability), with 
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 
S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (explaining that secondary-actor liability can be predicated on 
conduct that has the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of 
material fact). 
 190 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 191 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 192 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 193 See id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tatement, will fail to establish the causal nexus necessary for the court 
to impute reliance.
194
 
In the brief period since the Court issued the Stoneridge decision, 
scholars have noted the insufficiency of scheme liability.  One com-
mentator has opined that similar to the other existing tests for sec-
ondary-actor liability, “scheme liability focuses on the actions and in-
tent of the secondary actor rather than on whether the secondary 
actor has engaged in conduct upon which a plaintiff could presump-
tively rely.”
195
  Even advocates of scheme liability point out that there 
is but a thin distinction between scheme liability’s purpose-and-effect 
test and the standard scienter requirement of securities fraud.
196
  The 
purpose-and-effect test, its supporters say, is designed to determine 
whether the secondary actor’s conduct was sufficiently deceptive to 
warrant liability.
197
  Thus, while the scheme-liability concept may iden-
tify conduct that is sufficiently deceptive within the meaning of Rule 
10b-5, it does not identify the causal relationship between the sec-
ondary actor’s conduct and the primary actor’s issuance of a material 
misstatement.  A framework that does not adequately focus on that 
causal relationship is unlikely to pass muster under Stoneridge because 
it will be viewed as opening the litigation flood gates to actions 
against secondary actors who are, in the Court’s eyes, too remote 
from the primary violator’s conduct.  As one article has noted, “it is 
clear that the Court intended to eliminate scheme liability because 
the Court was concerned that it would expand the implied cause of 
action” to secondary actors who merely aid and abet the primary vi-
olator in releasing public misstatements.
198
  The result is that courts 
are left without a workable framework for imputing reliance and at-
taching liability in the secondary actor context. 
The goal of this Comment, therefore, is to propose a test that 
the courts can employ in cases involving secondary actors who engage 
in deceptive acts within the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 but who 
do not have a duty to disclose their activities and do not directly make 
a public misstatement.  Such a test for imputing reliance and impos-
ing liability must fit within the narrow parameters outlined by Justice 
Kennedy in Stoneridge, which dictate that reliance on the secondary 
actor’s conduct will only be presumed when the secondary actor’s de-
ceptive acts clearly make the primary actor’s issuance of a material 
 
 194 See id. 
 195 Chrisman, supra note 1, at 866. 
 196 Schanbaum, supra note 70, at 230–31. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Chrisman, supra note 1, at 879. 
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misstatement necessary or inevitable.
199
  In other words, the defen-
dant-secondary actor’s deceptive acts and the public misstatement 
made by the primary actor must be sufficiently close (or not too re-
mote) to allow the court to impute reliance and attach liability.  No 
longer is the defendant’s “but for” causation of the plaintiff investor’s 
losses sufficient to satisfy the reliance requirement.
200
  To establish re-
liance on the defendant’s deceptive acts, plaintiffs must now show 
that the defendant’s acts were a proximate cause of their losses.
201
  
Thus, a proper test will allow the courts to determine whether a di-
rect causal connection exists between the conduct of the defendant-
secondary actor and the public’s reliance on a misstatement issued by 
the primary actor.  Satisfaction of such a test will enable the com-
plaining investor to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance outlined in Basic.
202
 
VI. PROPOSED TEST: A TWO-PRONGED CAUSE AND EFFECT TEST 
The aim of the proposed test is to provide courts with a frame-
work for identifying factual situations where the defendant-secondary 
actor’s deceptive acts and the primary actor’s public misstatement are 
so closely linked that the secondary actor’s actions are akin to releas-
ing a misleading statement on which the public is presumed to rely.  
In other words, the test will identify those situations where a mislead-
ing public statement can appropriately be attributed to the secondary 
actor even though it is the primary actor who actually issues the miss-
tatement.  The test is a two-pronged, cause-and-effect, fact-based test.  
First, the cause prong focuses on the purposeful conduct of the sec-
ondary actor and the extent to which it caused the primary actor to 
make a material, public misstatement.  Second, the test focuses on 
the effect of the fraud resulting from the secondary actor’s conduct 
and the extent to which the secondary actor accrued a material bene-
fit from the fraud.  This Comment argues that plaintiffs can satisfy 
the causation-intensive reliance requirement of Stoneridge by demon-
strating that the defendant-secondary actors engaged in intentional 
conduct calculated to cause the public issuance of a misstatement 
and by showing that the secondary actor gained a material benefit as 
a result of his or her active role in the fraud. 
 
 199 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 200 Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. 
Inc., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing “but for” causation); Binder v. Gillespie, 
184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 201 STENGEL, FINK & FOURNIER, supra note 168, at 5. 
 202 See supra note 6. 
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A. The Cause: Intentional Steps Above and Beyond Drafting 
Documents 
In the wake of Stoneridge, plaintiffs must now do more than show 
that the fraud was a result of the secondary actor’s deceptive conduct.  
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the secondary actor’s deceptive acts 
made it necessary or inevitable that the primary violator’s public miss-
tatement would be made.
203
  Therefore, the cause prong of the test 
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of a direct causal 
connection between the secondary actor’s deceptive acts and the 
primary actor’s public misstatement on which the plaintiff investor 
presumably relied in making his or her investment decisions. 
Satisfying the cause prong depends on the extent of the role the 
conduct played in making the material misstatement a reality.  The 
first prong of the test for establishing reliance is met when a plaintiff 
alleges that the secondary actor engaged in purposeful conduct that 
actually caused the primary actor to make a public misstatement af-
fecting the value of securities.  The fact that a lawyer, accountant, or 
some other secondary actor purposefully put pen to paper and 
drafted a misstatement would be insufficient.
204
  The plaintiff must es-
tablish that the secondary actor took a series of purposeful steps from 
the point of drafting the misstatement to its actual release to ensure 
the achievement of his fraudulent designs.  Such a series of critical, 
affirmative steps above and beyond simply drafting the misstatement 
could include encouraging the primary actor to release the misstate-
ment, counseling the primary actor on the institutionalization of a 
process enabling the dissemination of false or misleading statements, 
otherwise facilitating misstatements, or pressuring the client to make 
misleading statements. 
The idea is not completely theoretical.  Secondary actors have 
often gone beyond “acquiescing” in the demands of their clients.  
Many instances have occurred where auditors, insurers, and invest-
ment bankers have specifically designed structures to facilitate misre-
presentation of material facts concerning a company’s financial con-
dition and openly marketed them to their clients.
205
  Several examples 
are worth noting.  Citigroup developed a plan to sell other compa-
nies on Enron-style schemes, which included a presentation on trans-
 
 203 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 204 See discussion supra Part V.D. 
 205 Brief for Arkansas, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and the New York State Common 
Retirement Fund, et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-
43). 
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actions described as balance-sheet friendly and advertisements pro-
moting the use of a special purpose entity operated by Citigroup to 
effect such transactions.
206
  The scheme advertised would in effect 
make certain commodities trades appear as though they were inde-
pendent and unrelated even though they were not.
207
  Arthur Ander-
sen, the now defunct accounting firm, developed a white paper that 
explained how to circumvent certain accounting standards to create 
fictitious revenue.
208
  A.I.G., the insurance giant, paid $10 million to 
the SEC to settle a charge that it had “played an indispensible part” in 
a fraud by selling an insurance product “A.I.G. had developed and 
marketed for the specific purpose of helping issuers to report false 
financial information to the public.”
209
 
More recently, Lehman Brothers used misleading accounting 
and legal maneuvers to disguise its true financial health as the credit 
crisis of 2008 began to unfold.  In fact, shortly before its demise in 
September 2008, Lehman Brothers used repurchase agreements 
(“repos”)
210
 to temporarily move toxic securities off its balance sheet 
and reduce leverage in an effort to foster the false perception among 
investors that it had sold such securities and was on a strong financial 
footing.
211
  Notably, Lehman Brothers sought a law firm that would 
 
 206 The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse: Hearings Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. of Investigations of the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) 
(statement of Robert L. Roach, Chief Investigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investi-
gations). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Dennis K. Berman, Julia Angwin & Chip Cummins, Tricks of the Trade: As Market 
Bubble Neared End, Bogus Swaps Provided a Lift, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at A1. 
 209 Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Wants a Monitor to Examine A.I.G.’s Books, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at C1. 
 210 A repurchase agreement is one in which a firm transfers an asset to a third par-
ty as collateral for a short-term borrowing but agrees to repay the cash and take back 
the collateral at a certain point in the future.  See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Ex-
aminer, at 732 n.2848, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. March 
10, 2010) (08-13555).  Lehman Brothers often transferred securities to its European 
subsidiaries in intracompany “Repo 105” transfers.  See id. at 786. 
 211 See id. at 732–39.  The examiner reported,  
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days 
prior to reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage 
and balance sheet.  Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the 
cash borrowing from the Repo 105 transaction – i.e., although Lehman 
had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in these transactions, 
Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt.  
Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down 
other liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total 
assets reported on its balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios. . . . 
Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its 
accounting treatment for these transactions, the considerable escala-
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provide an opinion letter stating that these transactions were true 
sales (i.e., not short-term loan agreements).
212
  The legal opinion 
passing on the repurchase scheme was certainly a critical part of 
Lehman Brothers’ ultimately failed effort to hide from market view 
its vast stockpile of illiquid securities and the true extent of its indeb-
tedness.
213
  The Lehman Brothers debacle thus further illustrates the 
direct effect that the work of secondary actors, like law firms, have on 
financial markets. 
While the culpability of the aforementioned actors and the spe-
cific details of their conduct is not the concern of this Comment, if 
their actions were intentionally calculated to complete a fraudulent 
scheme, then such conduct clearly would establish a direct causal 
connection between the secondary actor’s conduct and the release of 
the statement on which the investors relied.
214
 
 
tion of its total Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and into 2008, or the ma-
terial impact these transactions had on the firm’s publicly reported net 
leverage ratio. 
Id. at 732–34 (internal footnotes omitted).  The assets Lehman Brothers transferred 
as part of these repurchase transactions included commercial mortgage-backed se-
curities, sub-prime mortgages, and leveraged loans.  Id. at 738–37.  In the second 
quarter of 2008, Lehman Brothers temporarily removed as much as $50.38 billion in 
securities from its balance sheet.  Id. at 742. 
 212 See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, supra note 210, at 740. 
 213 In order to classify the repurchase agreements as true sales for accounting 
purposes, Lehman Brothers had to book the underlying transactions as true sales at 
law.  Id. at 782–83.  Generally speaking, repurchase transactions cannot be treated as 
sales in the United States because U.S. attorneys cannot furnish true sale opinion let-
ters under U.S. law.  Id. at 784.  Therefore, Lehman Brothers engaged Linklaters, a 
British law firm, to analyze the transactions under English law for one of its Euro-
pean subsidiaries through which it executed these repurchase transactions.  See id. at 
740, 782–86.  Notably, Lehman Brothers failed to notify its investors that it recorded 
the repurchase transactions as true sales on the basis of an English legal opinion, not 
U.S. law.  See id. at 987.  This Comment does not mean to suggest that the opinion 
letter provided by Linklaters was improper; it merely raises this issue to point out that 
the work of secondary actors, like law firms, has a direct effect on financial markets. 
 214 Distinguishing a legitimate business arrangement between the secondary and 
primary actor that happens to facilitate fraud and one that encompasses intentional 
actions calculated to effectuate fraud will not always be an easy task.  Certain actions 
that constitute purposeful steps to achieve fraudulent designs in some cases may be 
completely innocent in others.  See Taavi Annus, Note, Scheme Liability Under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 MO. L. REV. 855, 883–90 (2007) (discuss-
ing the difficulties associated with distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate 
business transactions entered by secondary actors, such as major investment banks).  
Nevertheless, the scienter requirement of securities fraud actions stands as a bulwark 
against implicating innocent parties and will necessarily resolve such difficulties.  
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (Scienter is the “intent to 
deceive, defraud, or manipulate.”). 
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B. The Effect: Defrauded Investors and an Enriched Secondary Actor 
The second part of this new test for imputing reliance and im-
posing liability in secondary actor cases requires a showing that the 
secondary actor actually received some material benefit as a result of 
his or her participation in the fraudulent scheme.  Post-Stoneridge, es-
tablishing that the secondary actor was enriched by the fraud he per-
petrated is crucial because of the Court’s concern that the plaintiffs’ 
injuries were too far removed from the defendants’ deceptive acts to 
enable the court to find some connection between the two.
215
  Show-
ing that the defendant-secondary actor was directly enriched by the 
fraudulent scheme overcomes Justice Kennedy’s concern about re-
moteness, demonstrating how involved the secondary actor was in the 
public misstatement on which the investor relied and how likely it was 
that a public misstatement would be made.  If a secondary actor has a 
sizeable financial gain or loss at stake in the fraud, the fraudulent 
public misstatement can become the “necessary or inevitable” result 
of the secondary actor’s deceptive acts.  This is because without such 
a material misstatement by the primary actor, the secondary actor 
would not have been able to achieve his or her ends. 
Situations in which secondary actors derive a material benefit 
from the deceptive acts are distinguishable from the Stoneridge case.  
In Stoneridge, no facts exist in the record to indicate that Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola derived any material benefit from participating 
in the sham transactions.
216
  Both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola had 
existing contractual arrangements with Charter, and no evidence in-
dicated that the contracts were ever contingent upon their participa-
tion in the scheme.
217
  Notably, however, while direct evidence may 
not have existed to explain why Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola parti-
cipated in Charter’s scheme, the defendants may have profited none-
theless through a quid pro quo relationship which ensured that Char-
ter would continue to buy the defendants’ products, and “that 
someday Charter [might] return the favor when the scheming com-
 
 215 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 
770 (2008) (“[R]eliance is tied to causation, leading to the inquiry whether respon-
dents’ acts were immediate or remote to the injury.”). 
 216 See id. at 766–67.  “Charter arranged to overpay respondents $20 for each set 
top box it purchased until the end of the year, with the understanding that respon-
dents would return the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter.”  Id. at 
766.  “And their [referring to Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc.] own finan-
cial statements booked the transactions as a wash, under generally accepted account-
ing principles.”  Id. at 767. 
 217 See id. at 761. 
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panies needed to pad their own books to deceive shareholders.”
218
  
Nevertheless, even if the defendants profited indirectly they would 
avoid liability under the proposed test because it requires evidence of 
a direct material benefit.  In future cases, plaintiffs seeking recovery 
under the proposed test would have to show that the secondary actors 
received a real, tangible benefit for their deceptive acts, such as new 
business contracts, alteration of existing contracts to include more fa-
vorable terms, or satisfaction of loan obligations that otherwise would 
have become bad debts.  By requiring the plaintiffs to show that the 
secondary actor defendants actually received a benefit from actively 
promoting the fraud, the test ensures that liability will only be im-
posed when the fraud is closely connected to a secondary actor’s de-
ceptive conduct. 
VII.    ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED TEST 
The overarching rationale supporting this proposed test is, of 
course, the continued need for secondary-actor liability.  The reality 
is that shareholders of a company and the investing public at large do 
rely on the actions of secondary actors.
219
  Average investors have nei-
ther the time nor the resources to research every aspect of every 
company.
220
  The result is public reliance on a company’s financial 
statements, regulatory filings, annual reports, and the opinions of the 
investment community.
221
  These reports, which require the involve-
ment of secondary actors, affect the movement of securities’ prices on 
a daily basis.
222
  Secondary actors thus have a crucial impact on securi-
ties markets, whether they are lawyers, accountants, investment bank-
ers, or others in the business community.  This impact justifies an en-
deavor to clarify the reliance framework in the post-Stoneridge 
environment and ensure that plaintiffs can recover against culpable 
secondary actors. 
Adopting the test proposed in this Comment will allow courts to 
impute reliance and attach secondary-actor liability while also ensur-
ing that liability is not imposed on parties that are innocent or only 
tangentially connected to the fraud.  In requiring a plaintiff to show 
that the defendant-secondary actor took additional steps beyond 
simply drafting the misstatement released by the primary actor, the 
 
 218 Gomm, supra note 12, at 479. 
 219 Id. at 478. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
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cause prong of this test goes beyond the tests employed before Stone-
ridge.
223
  It allows the courts to identify situations in which the miss-
tatement should be attributed to the secondary actor because, except 
for signing the document and transmitting it to the key financial 
news networks, the secondary actor took the critical steps necessary to 
ensure that the misleading statement would be released to the invest-
ing public.  The test effectively places the culpable secondary actor in 
the shoes of the primary actor for purposes of presuming reliance 
under Stoneridge, and it provides the courts with a clear strategy for 
avoiding the inequitable and unfair conclusion that a secondary actor 
can avoid liability simply because he did not imprint his name on a 
public document for which he was otherwise responsible.  At the 
same time, however, by focusing on whether the secondary actor ac-
tually caused a misrepresentation, the proposed test ensures that the 
scope of liability is not over-encompassing. 
In addition to clarifying the reliance requirement in a balanced 
fashion, the proposed two-pronged test responds to other policy con-
cerns as well.  The proposed test will discourage secondary actors 
from entering into relationships with primary actors that promote 
fraud and encourage secondary actors to ferret out such fraudulent 
activities.  Secondary actors such as law firms and auditors perform 
functions (“e.g., designing transactions, drafting press releases and 
prospectuses, and producing non-public opinions for issuers and un-
derwriters”) that are critical to the ability of companies to execute 
transactions.
224
  Without the honest services of secondary actors like 
law firms and auditors, managers of publicly traded companies can 
more easily inflate revenue and engage in other efforts to perpetrate 
fraud.
225
 
The corporate scandals of the past decade have illustrated the 
failure of professional service providers to block the fraudulent en-
deavors of corporate management.
226
  After all, secondary actors, such 
as lawyers and accountants, have an incentive to acquiesce in clients’ 
demands to assist with the preparation and dissemination of miss-
tatements: fees.
227
  Primary violators can “easily threaten to take their 
business elsewhere” when a secondary actor expresses an unwilling-
 
 223 See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
 224 Brief for Council of Institutional Investors et. al. as Amicus Curae Supporting 
Petitioners at 4, Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 
S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43). 
 225 Id. at 5. 
 226 Id. at 4. 
 227 Id. at 6. 
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ness to participate in a fraudulent scheme.
228
  Absent the specter of 
liability, the drive for profit on the part of the secondary actors will 
encourage the perpetration of fraud on the part of secondary actors.  
The test proposed in this Comment focuses squarely on the profit 
motive of the secondary actor.
229
  By holding those who extract ma-
terial gain from fraudulent schemes accountable, the test will thwart 
secondary actors who are lured by a desire to obtain or retain the 
business of those bent on engaging in fraud. 
VIII.   ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADOPTING THE PROPOSED TEST 
A principal public policy argument against enacting the pro-
posed test may be that even though the test is designed to impose lia-
bility only on the most culpable actors, the adoption of the test will 
lead to a litigation explosion by attracting potential plaintiffs who 
previously thought that Stoneridge precluded them from filing suits 
against secondary actors.
230
  Some might argue that the proposed test 
will open the flood gates to litigation because it ensures a measure of 
liability for deceptive acts even when there is no duty to disclose.
231
  
Members of the securities industry contend that “[i]f Section 10(b) 
did not require that duty as a condition to liability in the nondisclo-
sure context, every routine commercial or financial transaction with a 
public issuer would become a minefield of private securities-fraud 
liability exposure.”
232
  Litigation abuse might then become an even 
more significant problem for the securities industry in situations 
much like the one the market faced in Fall 2008: 
In the context of securities class actions, a variety of factors com-
bine to ensure that (i) class litigation is routinely brought in the 
wake of large or precipitous drops in the stock price of a publicly 
traded company, and (ii) a large portion of filed actions that sur-
 
 228 Id. 
 229 See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
 230 See Gomm, supra note 12, at 454–55 (“This article argues that while Stoneridge 
has further empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) in its 
mandate to police the securities market, it has also left a discouraging and confusing 
result for injured shareholders who want to seek private restitution for their losses.  
The result appears to be that, so long as companies do not disclose the public truth 
behind sham contracts and transactions in which they have participated (thereby 
causing reliance), the companies probably will not be vulnerable to private actions 
from shareholders.”). 
 231 See generally Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
and Futures Industry Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 
(2008) (No. 06-43) [hereinafter Brief for the Securities Industry]. 
 232 Id. at 3. 
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vive motions to dismiss settle before their merits are ever tested 
before a neutral trier of fact.
233
 
Therefore, creating a model by which plaintiffs can show reliance 
might only serve to encourage plaintiffs to file suits against numerous 
secondary actors.
234
 
Aside from arguing that the test itself is balanced and targeted at 
only those who have directly caused a fraudulent misrepresentation, 
this Comment counters that the lack of a clear framework for imput-
ing reliance in the wake of Stoneridge will cause an uptick in litigation, 
and the proposed test is what is needed to reduce meritless claims.  
While the majority in Stoneridge was driven by policy concerns about 
the scope of liability in securities cases and was motivated by a dislike 
of the implied right of action under § 10(b), “the opinion raises 
many more questions than it does answers.”
235
  The result is that the 
plaintiffs’ bar has already begun crafting new arguments explaining 
why they are entitled to a presumption of reliance, though with li-
mited success to be sure.
236
  Nevertheless, the possibility of litigation 
proceeding past the initial pleading stage remains in light of Stone-
ridge’s fact-specific application of the reliance requirement.
237
  In re-
sponse to the uncertainty Stoneridge has engendered, the proposed 
test posits a clear framework that plaintiffs can use to determine 
when their claims are actually viable.  Such a test will, therefore, limit 
the lawsuits to those situations where plaintiffs can plead that the 
named secondary actor defendant caused the fraudulent misrepre-
sentation which resulted in financial injury. 
The second principal challenge that the proposed test will face is 
the argument that it is unnecessary because the SEC has already been 
tasked with prosecuting secondary actors.
238
  The SEC, however, disa-
grees with this contention and argues that private litigation against 
secondary actors is necessary to prevent flagrant violations of securi-
ties laws because the SEC cannot possibly investigate and impose 
 
 233 Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6–7, Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43). 
 234 See Brief for the Securities Industry, supra note 231, at 3. 
 235 Chrisman, supra note 1, at 918. 
 236 The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 492. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of 
Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225, 
243 (2008). 
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sanctions on every secondary actor engaging in deceptive acts.
239
  The 
SEC noted in its amicus brief filed in the Simpson matter that without 
private suits against secondary actors, too many securities violations 
would go unpunished because groups of scheming secondary actors 
could deliberately plan for one schemer to issue the public misstate-
ment necessary for the successful completion of their fraud.
240
  This 
would essentially allow one schemer to risk liability while allowing 
each of the other participants to avoid it.
241
  The proposed test will 
ensure that private litigation properly supplements the efforts of the 
SEC to prosecute secondary actors, some of whom might otherwise 
elude liability. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
No one doubts that the scope of liability under § 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 has narrowed significantly in re-
cent years.  What was once a law broadly applied to those guilty of 
committing deceptive and manipulative acts in connection with the 
acquisition or disposition of financial instruments is now tightly cir-
cumscribed.  Regardless of the approach taken, the crucial matter for 
the courts has been the satisfaction of the age old reliance require-
ment.  The reliance requirement remains a legitimate cause for con-
cern.  How can one say, absent some misstatement or some duty to 
disclose, that an investor buying or selling securities relies on the de-
ceptive conduct of some secondary actor who remains unknown to 
that investor? 
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court provided some guidance but 
did not answer the question fully.  In accordance with Rule 10b-5, Jus-
tice Kennedy made clear that a material misstatement is not necessary 
for a finding of liability.  Had he said otherwise, the headlines might 
have proclaimed that the Court had dead-bolted the door on liability 
for secondary actors.
242
  Instead, in stating that “conduct itself can be 
deceptive,” a position that is in harmony with Rule 10b-5, the Court 
 
 239 See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits by Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/washington/ 
16bizcourt.html. 
 240 Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Appellants at 7, Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 
2006) (No. 04-55665). 
 241 Id. at 7. 
 242 For examples of the news headlines that preceded and proceeded the Stone-
ridge decision, see John Engler, Washington’s Biggest Decision, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007, 
at D-3; Greenhouse, supra note 239; Marc J. Lane, High Court Securities Case a Threat to 
Shaky Capital Markets, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Dec. 10, 2007, at 20. 
WILKES_FINAL FORAMTTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:17 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1849 
assured the continued viability of private suits against secondary ac-
tors who commit primary violations of Rule 10b-5 other than making 
a public misstatement. 
243
  The Court, however, did not fully explain 
how a plaintiff suing such a secondary actor would be able to show 
that he or she is entitled to a presumption of reliance on the second-
ary actor’s deceptive acts.  What the Court did say was that the causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s losses and the secondary actor’s 
deception was far too attenuated to impute reliance and attach liabili-
ty.  Only when such deception makes a public misstatement by a pri-
mary actor “necessary or inevitable” would the reliance requirement 
be satisfied. 
244
 
Although it narrowly circumscribes the scope of secondary-actor 
liability, Stoneridge does not prevent investors from attaching liability 
to secondary actors altogether.  The proposed test for presuming re-
liance in the secondary actor context explains that under circums-
tances factually distinguishable from Stoneridge, plaintiffs will be able 
to demonstrate that there is a close causal connection between the 
secondary actor’s deceitful conduct and their losses.  Under the pro-
posed test, reliance will be established when (1) the secondary actor 
has taken intentional steps calculated to defraud the plaintiff-
investor, and (2) the secondary actor has benefitted materially from 
the fraudulent ends he successfully achieved in partnership with the 
primary actor. 
245
  Judicial recognition of this proposed test will pre-
vent the inequity of allowing critical participants in fraudulent 
schemes who shrewdly avoid placing their name on some public doc-
ument to avoid compensating investors for their losses, and it will do 
so without trapping innocent parties in costly litigation. 
 
 
 
 243 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 
(2008). 
 244 See id. at 771. 
 245 See supra Part IV. 
